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UNION SECURITY AND THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
ERWIN S. MAYER*
N analyzing the law of labor relations, it is useful to regard it as governing a tripartite, private relation between employers, employees, and
unions. The federal labor legislation of the two decades prior to 1947
consisted largely of a set of restraints placed on employers in their relations especially with unions. One may view the union-security provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act' as an attempt to place parallel restraints
on unions in their relations with employers and with employees. But
whereas in the former case the law essentially regarded the union as an
aggregate or extension of its members, in the latter case, the law may
be said to have taken cognizance of the fact that the union exists as a
separate entity with interests that may not always be consistent with
those of actual or potential members.
While it is dear that the Taft-Hartley Act has placed a number of
other restrictions upon unions, this particular restraint appears to have
been of greatest moment to them, if one may judge from the volume
of comment they have lavished on the union-security provisions of the
law in their official publications. It is the purpose of this article to
assemble and to evaluate the objections unions have raised against the
union-security provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.2
*A.B. 1949, Hunter College 5 Ph.D. 1956, University of Washington; Chairman,
Department of Economics, Business and Government, Western Washington College.
1 6 Stat. 136 0947), 29 U.S.C. §§ x4'-97 (1958).
'A word is in order about the sources of this article. In a broader survey of union
attitudes toward the Taft-Hartley Act, the results of which are contained in Mayer,
Union Attitudes Toward the Taft-Hartley 4ct: 1947-z954 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1956), the writer surveyed some 1,476 articles
which appeared in twenty-one union periodicals between 1947 and 1954. All of these
articles dealt, in one way or another, with the Act. Some idea may be gleaned of the
relative importance attached by unions to the changes in union-security arrangements

from the fact that more than one-fourth of all of the articles dealt with this particular
issue.
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It seems desirable to preface the main body of this article with a brief
discussion of the present legal status of union security under federal law.
With the exception of the Railway Labor Act of 1926,3 federal legislation had imposed no restrictions on union-security agreements, provided
the union involved was a bona fide labor organization not dominated
by an employer. This writer would deny the validity of the contention
to the contrary-viz., that the proviso to section 8(3) of the Wagner
Act' merely represented congressional acquiescence to state law on the
matter.5 However one may read section 8(a)(3) and its proviso, it
exempted the dosed shop and similar arrangements from the more general ban on discrimination in employment, which clearly had been intended to deal with employer discrimination against union members.
In the Taft-Hartley Act, the proviso is changed so as to prohibit any
discrimination in hiring based on union membership, but it permits the
conclusion of union-shop agreements. Until 1951, when the Act was
amended, the negotiation of such an agreement had to be preceded by an
authorization election in which a majority of the employees concerned
had voted to authorize negotiation of a union shop. Further, in order
to be eligible to petition for such an election, compliance with the
various filing requirements of the Act had been incumbent upon the
petitioning union. The 1951 amendment removed the election requirement but made possible the rescission of a union's authority to enter into
a union-shop agreement by means of a so-called deauthorization election.6
The Taft-Hartley Act provides that an employer may not enforce a
union-shop clause against a nonunion worker if the employer has reason
to believe that the employee was refused membership on normal terms
or that he was expelled from the union for any reason other than his
failure to tender the regular dues and initiation fees. Similarly, it is an
unfair labor practice for a union to seek to enforce an unlawful unionsecurity agreement or to seek to enforce a lawful agreement in an unlawful manner. Further, section 8(b)(5) makes it an unfair labor
practice for a union to impose excessive or discriminatory initiation fees
under a union-shop agreement. Finally, section 14(b), currently the
most controversial section of the Act, confers upon state law supremacy
+4 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ isi-88 (x958).
49 Stat. 45 (935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).

Reilly, State Rights and the Law of Labor Relations, in CHAMBERLIN, ET AL.,
LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 107 (1958).

65 Stat. 6ox (95s),

9 U.S.C. § 259(e) (1958), amending 61 Stat. 43 (947).
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over federal law with respect to union security, provided the former is
more restrictive than the latter.
The subject matter of this article may conveniently be divided into
the following categories: (i) the dosed shop; (2) limitations on the
union shop; (3) prerequisites to the negotiation and enforcement of the
union shop; and (4) the union hiring hall. Clearly, under the TaftHartley Act the hiring hall is a special case of the dosed shop but for
reasons that will become apparent, it will be discussed separately.

I
THE CLOSED SHOP

Though there are a number of general objections to the ban on the
dosed shop, alleging that it represents bad legislative judgment, most of
the articles on the dosed shop present specific grievances. The International Typographical Union was among the first to be affected by this
aspect of the new law, because of its long-term commitment to the dosed
shop and because of the fortuitous circumstance that a number of its
contracts expired shortly after the Taft-Hartley Act went into effect.
The initial position adopted by the ITU admitted of no compromise.
Woodruff Randolph, then ITU president, took the position that the
union would not give up the dosed shop; that if it could not contract
for it, it would enter into no contract, but would insist on the observance
of all ITU laws (including those pertaining to the dosed shop) and
that ITU members would not work in any shop that did not adhere

to ITU laws. 7 The union further charged that the intent of the
American Newspaper Publishers Association in filing complaints against
the ITU was to Cinject competing non-union men" into the jobs of

union men." When the union, after much litigation, was finally convicted of a charge of refusal to bargain, it was forced to abandon. its
policy. It persisted, however, in refusing to discipline members unwilling to work with nonunion men.9
It is argued repeatedly that the ban on the dosed shop represents
an unwarranted interference with the right of the parties to a contract
to agree on terms suitable to themselves. An exaggerated form of this
thesis is found in a speech by the president of the Wisconsin Federation
' The Federal and State Laws 4gainst Closed Shop, iii

0947).

TYPOGRAPHICAL J. 12

' The NLRB Case 4gainst the ITU in Baltimore, Md., IIi
362 (1947)-

'Involuntary Servitude, 112 Ty'oRAHicAL J. io (9+-8).

TYPOGRAPHICAL J.
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the government says it is a crim-

inal offence to enter into an agreement, subject to a rather stiff fine and
incarceration in a federal penal institution .... ,,10 Presumably this
refers to a contempt action that might arise out of a refusal to enter
into a lawful agreement rather than, as the quoted phrase suggests, a
criminal action arising out of an unlawful contract. Since no other
form of criminal action can arise under title one of the act, this appears to be the only possible interpretation.
One of the few arguments against the ban on the dosed shop with
which many students of the subject may agree is that it has tended to
disturb cordial relations of long standing between employers and unions.
Also found repeatedly is an argument exhuming once more the presumably long-laid ghost of the open shop, with its connotations of the
American Plan of the 192o's. Thus, in commenting on an unidentified
court decision dealing with union activity designed to encourage union
members to refuse to work with nonmembers, George Meany argues
that "the Taft-Hartley Law does what employers under the American
Plan could not do."' 1 Nonetheless, it is doubtful that Mr. Meany
would be willing to exchange the position of unions in 1951 for their
position in the 1920's.
An interesting argument, not so much against the Taft-Hartley Act
as in favor of the dosed shop, is found in an editorial by the late William Green, who saw the dosed shop as an institution of spiritual value
to union men, in that it protects their right to work with whom they
choose.' 2 A similar thesis was advanced by John L. Lewis in a press
interview in which he denied the formal existence of the dosed shop in
the coal mines, but allowed that the spontaneous action of the miners
8
might in effect result in a dosed-shop situation, for
that, after all, comes from the attitude of the men who go down into the
mines as whether they would work there in the mine amid the hazardous
conditions with a man they might call a hater of unions. ...
One Teamster spokesman combines this philosophical approach with a
very practical one in an argument that has since been used as the basis
for a new institution-4.e., the fee system. The writer argues that since
the working conditions existing today represent an improvement at-

20 i2

TYPOGRAPHICAL J. 56 (x948).
" Our Job for r952, Am. Federationist, Aug.

1951 )

p. 4.

"Am. Federationist, Sept. 1948, p. i4.
23Leuds on "Meet the Press", U.M.W.J., May 15, 1954, p. 14.
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tained at a cost to union members, new employees have a moral duty to
join the union if they want to partake of its benefits, and that the dosed
shop is the best way to provide assurance that the worker will see his
4
moral duty properly.'
An interesting comment is found in the American Flint, to the effect
that the ban on the closed shop has resulted, among other things, in
widespread evasion of the law. 5 It is widely known that this has, in
fact, been true, though the extent of the evasion is obviously impossible
to ascertain. One may suppose that evasion has been widespread in the
building trades-a traditional closed-shop area-from the fact that no
comment on this issue was found in the official journals of those buildingtrades unions covered in this survey. The vacillations in NLRB policy
on jurisdiction over the building trades tend to reinforce this supposition.
Any kind of union-security agreement can be negotiated and enforced, so long as no one complains of the matter. It is quite conceivable that in some areas, where the supply of particular kinds of labor
has traditionally been controlled by a union, where the union has not
been unduly exclusive, and particularly where employers have been
wont to use the union hall as an employment agency, the dosed shop
may be enforced for considerable periods of time, regardless of the law.
It is only when an employer resists the demands of the union, or where
an individual employee is refused employment because he lacks union
membership and is sufficiently aware of his legal rights to complain to
the NLRB, that the situation comes to official notice. Since there are
no criminal provisions in the federal law, the risks to the union are quite
small, though the monetary risks have been increased substantially by
recent decisions.
In evaluating union comment on the union-security issue, and on the
dosed shop in particular, it is interesting to consider why most American
unions attach so much importance to the matter. As the generic term
suggests, such arrangements are intended to provide for the security
of the union in its relations with the employer and with its members,
to the extent that this end can be achieved by assuring that all employees
of an employer are union members. Once the latter is assured, the
union is thenceforth freed from the necessity of continuous organizational activity in that plant or shop. Obviously, the concern with union
"Taft Reverses Wagner Philosophy, International Teamster, March 1948, p.
"r The Mad Hatter, American Flint, May 195o, p. 20.

20.
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security must also be read in the light of a long history of employer
tactics in resisting unionism. Under a dosed or union shop, it becomes
considerably easier for the union to display responsibility both in the
enforcement of its contractual obligation to the employer and in the
negotiation of new contracts. On the other hand, a secure union is in a
better position to bargain from strength, without the histrionics some
unions appear to believe essential for assuring the loyalty of the membership. Thus, to the employer, the advantages of dealing with a
secure union are counterbalanced by the disadvantages of facing a strong
union across the bargaining table. Presumably, an employer's attitude
toward union security will be strongly colored by his evaluation of the
relative advantages.
The arguments on the dosed shop appear to bear out the above
general speculations on union security. The dosed shop is the unionsecurity device par excellence, since it assures the union that all employees are always members of the union and presumably in general agreement with its aims, since the union controls its own admission policies.
Once achieved, the dosed shop virtually obviates further organizing
activity, since, in a sense, the employer, rather than the employee, has
been organized. It is quite clear that this system can and has led to
abuses. The degree of control over the supply of particular kinds of
labor that is effected by the dosed shop, when placed in the hands of
a union that is disposed to restrict entry severely, is dearly against the
public interest. Employees may easily be deprived of their right to
choose their representatives after a dosed shop has been in existence
for some time, because of stringent union penalties against dual unionism. Should the union cease to serve the interests of its members, the
dosed shop can easily insulate the union against worker dissatisfaction.
A further abuse of the dosed shop, certainly not unknown, is the device
of organizing workers indirectly, by entering into a closed-shop contract
with a willing employer in the first instance, thus precluding workers
from making a free choice at the outset. While one may agree that the
dosed shop is a means to industrial peace in many situations, it does not
follow that its application in a manner inconsistent with the free choice
of workers is justifiable. Certainly such an application conflicts not
only with the Taft-Hartley Act, but with the spirit of the Wagner Act
as well, which is to give workers wide latitude in their choice of bargaining agents. This, indeed, must be regarded as the essence of both laws.
The specific arguments that the ban on the dosed shop interferes

Vol. i96i : 505]

TA4FT-HA1RTLEY

ACT

with the right to contract freely and that it upsets existing relationships
of long standing cannot be taken too seriously. While the Act dearly
does both, it is a well-established principle of law that private contracts
violative of public policy do not enjoy the protection of law. Unions
have long approved this principle in different contexts-e.g., the yellowdog contract, child labor, and so forth.
It is of interest, in analyzing union arguments concerned with the
dosed shop, to note that of io6 articles dealing with this topic, 85
appeared in AFL-union journals, and only 21 in the journals of CIO
and independent unions. This compares to 178 and 196 articles, respectively, out of the total of 374 articles on all phases of union security
covered by this study. While broad generalizations about craft and
industrial unions, made on the basis of premerger affiliation, are frequently unsound, in this instance, the generalization that craft unions
have tended to show far more concern with this issue than have industrial unions seems useful, considering that it has been largely in
craft-union areas of jurisdiction that the dosed shop has been prevalent.
It is not this writer's intention to imply some kind of mystical relation
between craft consciousness and the dosed shop. Rather, the point is
that the dosed shop has been an important protective device in those
industrial areas where the unit of employment is typically small, where
interemployer mobility is high, and where interoccupational mobility is
low.

II

LIMITATIONS ON THE UNION SHOP AND iTs ENFORCEMENT

A good deal of discussion is devoted to the limitations on enforcement of union-shop agreements. It is argued, for example, that this
limitation tends to have the effect of making mere dues-payers of union
members, since no participation in union affairs can be required by means
of fines for non-attendance at union meetings and so forth. It is argued
that this limitation is in direct conflict with one of the avowed objectives
of the proponents of the law, the promotion of union democracy." It
may be remarked that while attendance at meetings cannot be enforced
by means of fines unless the member pays them voluntarily, 7 the
union can achieve the same objective by remitting part of the regular
dues to those attending meetings, according to an obiter dictum contained in the decision cited.
" Taft Reverses Wagner Philosophy, International Teamster, March 1948, p. 20.
"7 Electric Aito-LiFe Company, 92 NLRB 1073 (195.).
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It is further alleged that the limitations on enforcement of the union
shop leave the union vulnerable to penetration by various undesirables,
such as thieves, spies, employer stooges, rats, scabs, sex perverts, dope
adicts, and, in particular, Communists. The United Mine Workers
Union argues, for example, that the Act is designed to create disrespect
8
for the law, because of'
...the paradoxical provisions of the law which demand an anti-"Commie"
affidavit from the officials of trade unions . ..and at the same time compels
trade unions to accept into membership an avowed member of the "Commie"
party.
The obvious overstatement involved in this argument--i.e., that the law
requires the union to accept various undesirables, is found with particular frequency in the Typographical Journal, which carried at least
eight articles in this vein between 1948 and 1952.
Found with greater frequency is the more realistic argument that
the union can reject undesirables, but cannot force employers to discharge them, or prevent employers from hiring them, as the case may
be. This argument has been found most often in the National Maritime
Union's Pilot since the hiring hall was found to be unlawful. The point
is made with considerable force by Joseph Curran, as follows:19
In seeking to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act, the shipping people are
supporting the law that allows the dope fiends to ship while screening off the
ships union members who stand for a principle. (Not only does the TaftHartley Law allow the dope fiend to ship, but the law protects the sex
maniacs, the 'con' man, the dope peddlers, all the corrupt elements who make
use of the Taft-Hartley Law to protect their 'rights' to ship outside the
controls of a conscientious union.) Remember that the ship owners want to
strengthen the law that protects our most dangerous elements.
The foregoing arguments provide an interesting glimpse at the
contrast between the closed shop and the pre-Taft-Hartley union shop
on the one hand, and the union shop permissible under the Act on the
other, at least in the thinking of unions. Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act,
the effective difference between the two arrangements were relatively
minor. In many ways, both types of agreements achieved the same
objectives, the sole difference being that under the union shop, control
over hiring remained with the employer. It is not to be implied that
18

19

There is Plenty for Labor to Think About, U.M.W.J., Sept. x, 947, p. 8.
Passing the Word, Pilot, June 14, 1951, p. 2.
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control over hiring, where it exists or existed, is a trivial aspect of union
security. Clearly in the skilled trades and in the maritime trades, control over hiring is a means for apportioning what American labor has
generally regarded as scarce opportunities-jobs-and of protecting them
for a favored group. The dosed shop is, in many ways, a symptom of
this scarcity consciousness, and the attacks upon its prohibition must
be regarded in that light. But in the mass-production industries, control over hiring has not been an important objective of unions, since
such control would impose upon the union the great administrative
burden of furnishing labor to the employer. Where the number of
workers involved is relatively small, the advantages to be gained from
job control outweigh the costs involved in administering an employment
office. But where the number of employees required by a single employer may run into tens of thousands, and where considerable changes
in the number of employees take place regularly, the cost to the union
would probably be greater than could be justified in terms of the advantage gained. Under the pre-Taft-Hartley union shop, the security
of the union against internal disruption and external aggression by rival
unions and by hostile employers was maximized. Unions could and did
discipline their members on the ground of attempting to disrupt the
union, or of dual unionism. Some unions made ineligible for membership certain classes of individuals, such as communists, or, as in the case
of the NMU, convicted narcotics and sex offenders. What is more significant, the union was able to secure the discharge or suspension of employees on disciplinary grounds.
Under the limitations imposed by the Act, effective parity between
the illegal closed shop and the legal union shop no longer exists. Internal discipline can be maintained only at the potential cost of losing
,members. While the argument that the employer can force all sorts
of "undesirables" into the union is dearly invalid, it is equally dear
that the union has the alternative of either losing some of its actual or
potential members, or admitting anyone who wants to join. In this
sense, there is merit in the argument that the union security permitted
under the law is of small value. On the other hand, to the extent
that the union's bargaining strength is derived from financial strength,
the argument is without merit, since dearly the union shop, in whatever
form, maximizes the union's dues income (unless the demand for the
labor represented by the union is inelastic, and the union takes account
of this fact in the level of its dues).
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Section 14(b),20 which, in effect, delegates to the states the authority
to permit or prohibit the union shop within their respective boundaries,
comes under frequent attack. Most of the articles in this category
attack the procedure on the ground that it represents an improper
cession of federal power to the states. Thus, when the NLRB General
Counsel refused to conduct authorization elections in "right-to-work"
states, on the grounds that union-shop contracts could not be negotiated
in any event, the Typographical Journal accused him of taking it upon
himself to enforce state laws."- This particular argument is clearly
without merit. The great flood of applications for such elections for a
time threatened complete breakdown of the operations of the Board,
and its decision would seem reasonable in view of the fact that the outcome would be of no effect in any case. One may argue, on the other
hand, that an overwhelming affirmative vote, such as frequently resulted
in such elections, would give advocates of the union shop fairly good
ammunition in their fight for repeal of state "right-to-work" laws. While
the argument was never found in this form, it may be that it was in the
minds of some of the union editors. It must also be recognized, however, that had the Board consented to hold elections under the circumstances in question, it would implicitly have taken sides in a major controversy and it would unquestionably have undermined its own integrity
in so doing.
An argument with a good deal of merit is found in a number of
cases to the effect that section I 4 (b) is sharply discriminatory against
unions, in the sense that state law is made to apply only where it is more
restrictive than federal law, but where the reverse is true, the latter
applies.2 2 Certainly it is rare to make substantive rights granted under
federal law, in an area occupied by federal law, subject to limitation
or veto by state legislation. The fact that this is done here lends considerable color to the discrimination charge, particularly in view of the
rather ironic circumstance that section 14(a) explicitly denies any protection of the Act to supervisory personnel, whether or not there exists
23
any conflicting provision of state law.
Numerous articles charge that section i 4 (b) has had the effect, if
not the intent, of encouraging states to enact "right-to-work" laws. 4
20 61 Stat. 1i

(1947) , 29 U.s.C. § x64 (b) (.958).

"NLRB to Enforce State Anti-Union Laws, iiz TYPOGRAPHICAL J. 458 (2948).
"E.g., Double Standards, Catering Industry Employee, March 1953, p. 2.

23 61 Stat. 151 (947),
29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1958).
24 25 TYPOGRAPHICAL J. 277 (954);
U.M.W.J., March

News, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 7; 114 TYPOGRAPHICAL J. -45 (1949).

11 954, p. 3S CIO
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The available evidence with respect to most such laws does not sustain the charge. Examination of table I reveals that twelve laws were
passed in 1947 or earlier. While it is true that only the Florida law was
in existence before i947, it is difficult to believe that the eleven state
legislatures that passed such laws in 1947 were actuated by foreknowledge of what the Taft-Hartley Act was to contain. A more
plausible explanation seems to be that section i4(b) was included in the
act as a result of pressure from some of the states, and that the enactment of the state laws was provoked by the growth of unions all over
TABLE I
STATES wITH RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS IN i96i, AND YEAR OF ENACTMENT

State
Alabama ............
Arizona .............
Arkansas ............
Florida .............
Georgia .............
Indiana .............
Iowa ...............
Kansas .............
Mississippi ..........
Nebraska ...........

Year of Enactment
1953
1946, 1947
1947
1944
1947
1957
1947
1955, 1958
1954
1947

State

Year of Enactment
1951, 1952
1947
948
1954
1947
1947
1947, 1951
1955
1947, 1954

Nevada ............
North Carolina ......
North Dakota ......
South Carolina ......
South Dakota .......
Tennessee ..........
Texas ..............
Utah ...............
............
rit.ginia

Sousczs: 35 LRRM 3022 (1954), 36 LR M 3050 (1955), 42 LRRM 2127 (1958), 43 LRRM 73 (1959).

the country as a result of World War II and of generally favorable
economic conditions. The fact is that the first congressional mention
of the subject matter of section 14(b) is found in the Hartley Bill,
introduced on April io, 1947, after nine of the eleven state laws enacted in 1947 had already been approved.2 5 Probably the main point
here-is that unions quite honestly feel that this provision is discriminatory, but are themselves not too discriminating in their choice of arguments.
IlI
UNION-SHOP PREREQUISITES

The prerequisites for the negotiation of union-shop agreements have
been presented above: the union must be the majority representative of
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit; it must be in compliance with the filing requirements of the Act; and, until i95i, an
authorization election was required.
2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT

1947 57 (.948).

RELATIONS ACT,
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The first of these conditions, representative status, however acquired,
may normally be expected to precede union-shop negotiations in any
event. Hence, the argument, found occasionally, that a union-shop
election would have to be preceded by a representation election, thus
requiring all the more time,26 appears to originate in a vacuum, except
under very special circumstances. It is interesting to note, however,
that when it was proposed to remove the requirement of a representation election explicitly in those cases where employment is normally
of a casual nature, the CIO opposed the change, on the ground that
it was "... a device to aid 'Sweetheart Pacts.' 1127 On the other hand,
the AFL, and particularly the building-trades unions, strongly endorsed the amendment, which, nonetheless, failed.
Little attention is devoted to the filing requirements as prerequisites
to the union shop, though they come in for much comment in other
connections. The only comment here comes from the United Electrical
Workers Union, which describes the entire union-shop procedure as a
fraud designed to "ensnare" unions into compliance with the filing
requirements.2 8 It may be pointed out that the UE subsequently thus
ensnared itself in its unsuccessful struggle for existence after its expulsion (withdrawal?) from the CIO.
One of the requirements of the authorization election procedure
had been that a majority of those eligible to vote must vote affirmatively. This requirement is widely attacked on the ground that it is
discriminatory, since this type of supermajority is required in virtually
no other election, and in none under the Taft-Hartley Act. Clearly
this argument is valid. Such voting requirements are generally reserved for approval of bond issues and the like in local elections. The
requirements seems to reveal a congressional intent to make it as
difficult as possible for unions to negotiate a union shop. A special
burden is placed on those employees who favor the union shop, since
those who oppose it need do nothing, failure to vote amounting in effect
to a "no" vote.
This requirement also comes in for a certain amount of ridicule.
Thus, it is argued that Congress ought to put the same requirement on
its own election, in which case most members could not hold their seats.
It is also argued, evidently on the basis of experience, that employees
who quit or die in the interval between the establishment of the eligi:5 The Taft-Hartley Act, Ammunition, Aug. 1947, p. 6.
'7CIO News, Sept. so, 1951, p. 2.
2Across thw Board, UE News, Oct. 25, 1947, p. 11.
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bility list and the election remain on the list and thus effectively vote
29
against authorization.
The requirement for an authorization election must be regarded as an
expression of the belief on the part of Congress that workers feel a need
of protection against the power conferred upon the union by the union
shop. This notion comes in for considerable criticism, particularly by
3 0 and appears well-founded in the light
the American Photo-Engraver,
of the results of the authorization polls. As indicated in table II, 97
per cent of all elections resulted in authorization, with 9o per cent of
those voting, and 78 per cent of those eligible, voting for authorization.
If there were a strong undercurrent of feeling against the union shop,
one might expect either a strong protest vote or wholesale abstention.
It is obvious that neither took place. The results shown in the table
are strong evidence denying the validity of the congressional premise,
even if one is inclined to agree with the argument that they indicate a
TABLE II
UNION SHOP ELECTIONS AND RESULTS, 1947-51

Election Results

1948a

Total number of elections.
17,958
Number resulting in
authorization .........
17,601
Percentage of authorizations ................
97.9
Eligible voters .......... 1,852,333
Votes cast ............. 1,629,330
Votes cast as percentage
of eligibles ...........
87.9
Votes for authorization..
1,534,980
Votes for authorization as
percentage of votes cast
94.2
Votes for authorization as
percentage of eligibles..
82.8

1949

1950

1951b

1947-5lc

15,074

5,589

7,525

46,146

14,581

5,376

7,265

44,823

96.7
1,733,922
1,471,092

96.2
1,072,856
900,807

96.6
1,885,890
1,547,753

97.1
6,545,001
5,548,982

84.9
1,381,829

84.2
805,160

81.9
1,351,273

84.8
5,073,242

94.9

89.4

87.3

90.1

75.4

74.5

71.7

77.6

NoTms: - Fiscal
yeam
bJuly I, 1950-Oct. 22, 1951.
EAug. 22, 1947-Oct. 22, 1951.
Soci: Adapted from 17 zu ± Am. REP. 106 (1952).

desire to demonstrate group solidarity, as much as a desire to operate
31
under the union shop.
Another argument against the elections is that they have tended to
pre-empt the attention of the Board, at the expense of other and more
"5Under T-H: Absence Makes "Noes" Grow Unfonder of Union Shop, CIO
News,0 July z6, 1948, p. 8.
" Another Noble Experiment Dies, 43 AMERICAN PHOTO-ENGRAVER
Wrong
Bill of Goods, 4z AMERICAN PHOTO-ENGRAVER 113 (1950).
1
8 WOLLErr, LABOR RELATIONS AND FEDERAL LAW 70 (1949).
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important matters, specifically employer unfair labor practices, 2 and
that in any event, the procedure is a waste of time and money for unions
and for taxpayers alike, since the results in virtually all cases are perfectly predictable.8 3 The latter of these contentions seems to be borne
out by the evidence cited above. Further, there is slender evidence to
substantiate the contention, made elsewhere, 4 that the continuation of
the election procedure would have tended to moderate the "right-towork" movement in the last several years; while it is true that no
further state laws of this nature-were passed between i947 and 1951,
only two states passed such laws between 1951 and I953," while four
were passed in 1954, of which one has since been repealed.8" In 1958,
the movement received a rather solid set-back when the voters of only
one state accepted, while those of five states rejected such laws.8 7
The former of the two arguments-i.e., that the elections consumed
an unconscionable amount of the Board's time, appears to be borne out
by the Board's own reports. In fiscal 1948, the Board received over
35,000 cases, of which more than 26,ooo were petitions for authorization elections. This compares to a total case load of 15,000 in fiscal
1947. As a result, in 1948, only about half as many representation
elections were conducted as in 1947. Also, in 1947, the Board dosed
a total of 4,014 unfair labor practice cases, while only 3,643 such cases
were dosed in 1948.3'
While most segments of labor supported the repeal of the election
requirement as a step in the right direction, the change was not regarded
as a great improvement. The move for repeal had been introduced as
early as 1948 in the Ives-Landis bill, which was, however, defeated. At
that time, the CIO opposed repeal on the ground that it was merely
intended to protect employers from the embarrassment caused them by
the election results.39 These results were used as a dub in many negotiations, with the suggestion that they imposed a moral duty on employers
32 Pilot, Nov. 30, 1950, p. 5.

asCIO News, Dec. iz,1949, p. 2.
" Cohn, Union Shop Polls: A Solution to the Right-to-Work Issue,

12

INDUSTRIAL

AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 252 (959).

" Alabama and Nevada. See Table I.
" Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia. See Table I. Louisiana
repealed its law in 1956. 38 L.R.R.M. 3 (.956).
"'Right-to-work proposals were defeated in California, Colorado, Idaho, Ohio, and
Washington. Kansas passed a right-to-work law. 43 L.R.R.M. 73 (x959).
1s83
NLRB ANN. REP. i1, 96-97 (x948) i 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 2, 84 (1947).
s'CIO News, May io, 1948, p. 2.
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to agree to a union shop. The UMW, however, was the only union
among those examined, to go on record in opposition to repeal. It
accused the leaders of the federations of duplicity, in that they had
retreated from their earlier insistence on repeal of the entire Act, 40 and

argued that the only result of the amendment would be to get Senator
Taft, one of the sponsors of the amendment,
,41
hook."

". .

. off the political

IV
THE MARITIME HIRING HALL
It was indicated at the begining of this article that the relation of
the Taft-Hartley Act to the hiring hall is, in fact, a special case of
the more general problem of the closed shop. In the specific case
studied, however, that of the reaction of the NMU, certain special conditions supervened to create a particularly violent reaction. In the first
place, the Port of New York, the NMU's major area of operation, was,
until very recently a classic case study in the contrast between maritime
operations with and without a hiring hall, with particular emphasis on
the deplorable conditions persisting in longshoring. But this aspect
of the problem is implicit in the arguments, rather than explicit, with
various references to the evils of the shape-up, the crimp joint, and so
forth. The second of the conditions alluded to above was that at the
expiration of the NMU contracts providing for the hiring hall, on June
15, 1948, the union was in the throes of a severe internecine struggle
for control between a Communist faction on the one hand, and Joseph
Curran, the president, and his more or less anti-Communist faction on
the other. With this vicious struggle about to come to a head in the
union's election of officers, neither faction could afford to concede the
possibility of a compromise on the hiring hall. Nonetheless, when a
national emergency injunction was issued in the face of a threatened
strike over the hiring hall, the Communist faction accused Curran of
preparing for a compromise when he refused to call a strike and insisted that a strike in violation of the injunction would seriously imperil
the future existence of the union. Curran, in his turn, accused the
Communists of wanting to precipitate a strike in violation of the injunction since they were about to suffer defeat in the election.4 2 Cur"Some More Shenanigans on Hill as Congress Enacts Taft Amendment, U.M.W.J.,
Oct. I5) I951 , p. 15.

.4nother Weird T-H Development, U.M.W.J., Aug. 15, 1951, P. 5.
Passingthe Word, Pilot, July 2, 1948, p. z. For the Communist view, see

42 Curran,

Council Drafts Plan to Meet Fight. . .

, Pilot, July 2, 1948, p. 5.
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ran's argument was, in essence, that the Communist faction was willing
to gamble the life of the union against their control of it.
What followed thereafter might well be entitled "The Natural
History of a Compromise." The union, after the defeat of the Communist faction, entered into an agreement with the ship operators under
which the hiring-hall was continued without modification, pending litigation before the NLRB and the courts. When the Board's decision
against the hiring hall was made public in April, 1949, the union was
once again involved in negotiations, and promptly accused the Board
of trying to wreck these negotiations. The union then stated its policy
on the matter in apparently unequivocal terms, as follows: "Any agency
that believes it can destroy the hiring hall, must be ready to destroy and
wipe out the union, because maritime workers will fight such attempts
43

to the bitter end."1

The agreement that was finally negotiated once again included the
hiring hall, pending final determination of the issue by the courts, and
in the hope that some legislation, either general or special, would be
forthcoming to legalize the existing arrangement. To meet all eventualities, however, a termination clause was included that was to become
operative should the hiring hall as constituted be found illegal in a final
proceeding. When it became obvious that no legislative relief was
forthcoming and that all efforts to retain the hiring hall in its existing
form were destined to fail, the way was gradually paved for compromise. In November 1949, an article appeared that stated that the
union can not "strike against the courts" 44-- i.e., in violation of a final
order. The same article also described, for the first time without
acidulous comment, the Pacific Coast Maritime Agreement of the Sailors
Union of the Pacific. The latter agreement, rumored to have been
worked out between the late Senator Taft and Harry Lundeberg, sidestepped the preferential hiring issue. An agreement on this model was
finally reached on the East Coast in 1950 embodying the following
45
wording:
In the hiring of Unlicensed Personnel the Company will prefer competent
and dependable applicants who have been previously employed on vessels
of one or more of the Companies under agreement with the Union, and the
Union, in furnishing Unlicensed Personnel to the Company through the
"Danger Ahead, Pilot, April 22, 1949, p. 2. (Emphasis added.)
" Taft-Hartley Law and the Hiring Hall, Pilot, Nov. 17, 1949, p. 19.
"ANMU Preserves Hiring Hall, Pilot, June iS, 1950, p. i. (Emphasis added.)

Vol. i96i: 505]

T]FT-H.ARTLEY 21 CT

facilities of its employment offices will recognize such preference and refer
Unlicensed Personnel to the Company with due regard thereto.
The union agrees to maintain, administer, and operate its employment
offices in accordance with law and assumes sole responsibility therefor.

Obviously, to the extent that the italicized portions of the quoted clause
were adhered to, this represented no fundamental change in the modus
operandi of the hiring hall, since those to whom the companies "give
preference" must necessarily have been members of the union.4 6 For
the next several years, the issue was dormant, largely because of the
sizeable volume of shipping and the consequent demand for seamen
originated from the Korean War, but it was revived in 1954 as a result
of a Board decision relating to the permit card system, which forced
47
the union to admit new members.
While the fundamental issue at stake in the debate over the hiring
hall is the same as in the case of the closed shop-namely, control over
hiring, virtually all of the articles found among the periodicals covered
in this survey originate in the NMU's Pilot, for obvious reasons. A few
words may be in order to place this issue in its proper perspective in the
maritime trades, as distinct, perhaps, from the dosed-shop issue in other
industrial areas. Employment in the maritime trades is generally on a
casual basis for unlicensed personnel, as well as for some of the licensed
personnel. A merchant seaman normally signs up for a single voyage
or for several successive voyages, depending on their length, after
which he commonly takes some time off for rest, family life, recreation,
perhaps a shoreside job, and so forth. The ship operator is consequently
always in need of workers, since the latter move from ship to ship,
from company to company, to take what jobs are available when they
want them. Under the union hiring hall, the operator obtains workers
from the hiring hall only. The dispatcher, an elected official of the
union in the hiring hall, dispatches men with the appropriate qualifications who are currently available for work. Dispatching is presumably
done in order of rotation on the so-called shipping list, a roster of all
members shipping out of the particular port, broken down according
to rating. If an individual is not available when called or is unwilling
' The Supreme Court recently held that a hiring-hall agreement that expressly pro-

hibited union preference was not illegal per se under the Taft-Hartley Act. Local 357,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (196t). The Court, pointing
out the economically useful features of the hiring hall, specifically rejected the Board's
ruling
in Mountain Pacific, i19 NLRB 883 (1958).
'T Permanente S.S. Corp., 107 NLRB 1111 (954).
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to take a particular job, his name is returned to the bottom of the list.
The operator has the option of rejecting a man he does not want on
specified grounds, such as drunkenness, incompetence, fighting on board,
and so forth, but a rejected man retains his place at the top of the shipping list until hired.
Since the hiring hall is operated by the union at its own expense,
one would expect that only union members will be dispatched; and under
the hiring contracts in existence when the Taft-Hartley Act came into
force, the operators could hire only through the union. If the union
could not furnish enough men, as happened on occasion, a permit-card
system was used, under which nonunion applicants could be dispatched
on payment of a fee. Admission of new members were rare, because
the union feared that the normal volume of employment would decrease
with the end of the war and decrease the average amount of employment to all members if membership was expanded.
Before the union had won the hiring hall, recruitment was commonly done on the dock and from various other places, such as waterfront taverns, flophouses, and the so-called crimp-joint. These methods
of hiring, especially when jobs were scarce, led to favoritism, kick-backs
to the hiring boss, and similar abuses, popularized in recent years in
connection with some of the investigations of the New York Waterfront
Commission. The union hiring hall, at least in theory and very likely
in fact, abolished all of these abuses after vicious struggles on both
coasts in the i930's.
The emotional fervor generated within the NMU by the ban on the
hiring hall may be appreciated by considering that half of all of the
Pilot articles on the various phases of the Taft-Hartley Act dealt with
this issue alone. While, as suggested above, this struggle in its early
stages was closely related to the factional strife within the union, the
tone of the articles suggests that it did not merely reflect agitation on
the part of the leaders of the union concerned with maintaining the
power the hiring unquestionably conferred upon them, but reflected
fairly accurately the feelings of the membership at large, who related
the improvements in their working conditions very definitely to the
establishment of the hiring hall.
V
CONCLUSION

The agitation on the part of unions following the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act fourteen years ago, especially with respect to the
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union-security, provisions of the Act has in more recent years abated.
It is impossible, of course, to discern whether or to what extent the
decline of the concern evinced earlier is due merely to the passage of
time, to resignation with respect to the possibility of alteration, or to
the fact that labor has found it possible to operate within the existing
framework of law. It would appear that the labor movement continues
vigorous and that it has turned much of its political effort in other
directions, particularly toward action at the state level.
Whether labor could by more astute strategy have obtained desired
changes in the Act is, of course, problematicali that its strategy was
poor appears obvious. Whatever truth may be found among the
sensational revelations of the McClellan Committee, the McClellan
hearings themselves are certain to have damaged sharply the prospects
of any state or federal legislation favorable to unions, particularly
with respect to union security. (One may, indeed, wonder whether
an effect of this sort was not intended at the inception of the hearings). Had the AFL-CIO shown the same courage with respect to
racketeering and sloppy financial practices in some of its member unions
as did the CIO in 1949 with respect to Communist-dominated unions,
recent restrictive legislation at the federal level might have been
averted, and the "right-to-work" movement might have been weakened
even more than was indicated by the 1958 elections. As the matter
stands, the "right-to-work" movement has probably gained considerable
strength from the hearings.
While radical changes in the status of union security appear unlikely,
one may speculate as to the attitude unions are likely to display in this
respect in the near future. Assuming that unions and employers will
be guided by the concept of peaceful co-existence, it is likely that the
issue of union security under federal law, with the possible exception of
section I4(b), will be dormant. Where unions enjoy the loyalty of
most of the employees in a bargaining unit, the security afforded the
union by the union-security provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act would
appear to be ample under most circumstances. On the other hand, should
employers in considerable numbers make a determined effort, with the
aid of the McClellan Committee records and astute public-relations
advice, to undermine unions with which they have contractual relations,
one may expect unions to bring the union-security issue very much to
the fore again. It remains to be seen whether the recent phase of
exacerbated industrial conflict is symptomatic of a long-run deterioration
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of relations between employers and unions, or whether it was merely a
passing phase attributable to the aftermath of the 1958 recession. If
the former, the result posited above may be expected to materialize.
If the latter is true, as is to be hoped, one may suspect that with the
appearance of a new generation of unionists (and of employers), liberated from the folklore of early-twentieth-century unionism, a new
phase in union-management relations may appear in which union security
as a fighting issue between the parties will be regarded as an anachronism
of the antedeluvian period, perhaps to be worshipped in public but not to
be taken seriously in private.

